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Abstract
This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when
cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the
incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.
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This work examines the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technolo-
gies when cross-participation exists at ownership level.1 We ￿nd this analysis
quite relevant since it is generally considered that each ￿rm is owned by a dif-
ferent shareholder (see, for example, Bester and Petrakis, 1993).
The question we analyze in this work can be illustrated by taking the auto-
mobile industry as an example. We focus our analysis on technologies that can
produce a single model of a product class (dedicated technologies). Elkins et
al. (2004) argue that the automobile industry has traditionally purchased this
type of technology to produce a given product with low costs per unit and high
volume. On the other hand, in this industry there are examples of partial own-
ership of rivals. One illustrative example is given by the French ￿rm Renault,
which acquired a 36.8% equity stake in Nissan Motor in 1999 (Renault Presse,
10/20/99). We set our model in this context.
Assuming a duopoly market structure, Bester and Petrakis (1993) analyze
￿rms￿technology choices when each ￿rm is owned by a di⁄erent shareholder.
They focus their analysis on the choice between two types of production tech-
nology: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology.
For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. We
extend this analysis by considering that one of the ￿rms is jointly owned by the
two shareholders and the other is owned by one of the shareholders.
Bester and Petrakis (1993) obtain that, for a determinate range of values
of parameters, there are two asymmetric equilibria: in each of them one ￿rm
adopts the low marginal cost technology and the other the high marginal cost
technology. However, unlike Bester and Petrakis (1993), we obtain that, in
general, there is only one asymmetric equilibrium: the ￿rm that is owned by
only one shareholder chooses the high marginal cost technology while the ￿rm
that is jointly owned by the two shareholders adopts the low marginal cost
technology. The reason for this result is the following. First, the latter ￿rm
has a higher output (i. e. is more aggressive) than the former ￿rm since only
the former ￿rm internalizes the fact that the two ￿rms compete in the product
1For an explanation of why partial ownership arrangements are formed see Alley (1997)
1market. Second, a ￿rm is more aggressive when adopting the low marginal cost
technology than when adopting the high marginal cost technology. This implies
that from the point of view of the shareholder who has a stake in both ￿rms the
incentive to adopt the high marginal cost technology is reinforced. By contrast,
the other shareholder will attempt to take advantage of this situation, which
reinforces the incentive to adopt the low marginal cost technology. We also
obtain that cross-participation at ownership level increases the range of values
of parameters for which only one ￿rm adopts the low marginal cost technology.
This means that, in comparison with the case in which each ￿rm is owned by
only one shareholder, under partial ownership there is a greater range of values
of parameters for which we obtain the asymmetric equilibrium in which only
one ￿rm adopts the low marginal cost technology.
2 The model and results
We consider a single industry consisting of two ￿rms, 1 and 2, that produce
a homogeneous good. Each ￿rm can choose between two di⁄erent production
technologies: a low marginal cost technology (Technology-l), which has constant
marginal cost cl = 0 and ￿xed cost Fl = F and a high marginal cost technology
(Technology-h), which has constant marginal cost ch and ￿xed cost Fh = 0.
There are two shareholders, A and B. Firm 1 is completely owned by share-
holder A while ￿rm 2 is jointly owned by the two shareholders, with shareholder
B having the majority of shares in ￿rm 2. We denote by ￿ (￿<1/2) the frac-
tion of shares that owner A has in ￿rm 2. As a result, ￿rm 1 is controlled by
shareholder A and ￿rm 2 by shareholder B. We assume linear inverse demand
function:p = a ￿ b(q1 + q2);a > 2c
1￿￿; where p is the market price and qi is the
output level of ￿rm i. Shareholders are assumed to maximize their total pro￿t,
which means that the objective function of shareholder A is ￿A = ￿1 + ￿￿2;
while the objective function of shareholder B is ￿B = (1￿￿)￿2, where the pro￿t
of ￿rm i is given by ￿i = (p ￿ ci)qi ￿ Fi, i=1, 2.
We consider a two stage game. In the ￿rst stage, the two shareholders
simultaneously choose the production technology. In the second stage, the two
shareholders take output decisions. We solve the game by backward induction
2from the last stage of the game to obtain a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Given that there are two di⁄erent technologies, there are four cases: (i) both
￿rms adopt Technology-l, (ii) both ￿rms adopt Technology-h, (iii) ￿rm 1 adopts
Technology-h and ￿rm 2 adopts Technology-l and, ￿nally, (iv) ￿rm 1 adopts
Technology-l and ￿rm 2 adopts Technology-h.
In stage two, each shareholder chooses the output level that maximize its
objective function. Solving these problems in each of the cases we obtain equi-








































(a ￿ c)2(1 ￿ ￿)












(a ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)c)(a(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2c)






(a ￿ ￿a + c + c￿)(a + c ￿ ￿c)
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿F;￿hh
B =
(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ c)2







b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ F(1 ￿ ￿);￿ll
A =
a2
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ F(1 + ￿);
￿lh
B =
(a + c)2(1 ￿ ￿)
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ F(1 ￿ ￿);￿hl
A =
(a ￿ 2c)2 + ￿c(5a ￿ ￿a ￿ c)
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿F;
￿lh
B =
(a ￿ 2c)2(1 ￿ ￿)
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ;￿hl
A =
(a + c)2 ￿ ￿c(5a ￿ ￿a ￿ 4c + ￿c)
b(3 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ F:
3Given that the output level of a ￿rm decreases with its own marginal cost of
production and increases with that of the rival ￿rm and since Technology-l has









i ;i = 1;2, where qlh
i and plh￿
i denote
the output level of ￿rm i and its net price of the marginal cost of production,
respectively, when this ￿rm adopts Technology-l and the other Technology-h;
the other expressions are interpreted similarly. Then, ￿rm i￿ s marginal cost re-
duction is strategically advantageous for ￿rm i since it increases the output level
of this ￿rm and the net price, and the higher net price and output level are, the
greater the pro￿t of the ￿rms is. This means that quantity competition creates
a positive strategic incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology. Therefore, if
we do not consider that there is cross-participation at ownership level, the gains
from a marginal cost reduction depend on three factors: (I) the price net of the
marginal cost of production (denoted as p￿), (II) the output level and (III)









i ;i = 1;2: Consequently, (I)
and (II) lead to a positive incentive to adopt Technology-l in both ￿rms. On
the other hand, (III) leads to a negative incentive to adopt Technology-l.
However, when we consider partial ownership of rivals, an additional e⁄ect
arises. When deciding the output level of ￿rm 1, shareholder A internalizes the
fact that ￿rms 1 and 2 compete in the product market. By contrast, shareholder
B does not internalize this e⁄ect. As a result, for a given pair of technologies
(one for each ￿rm), the output level of ￿rm 2 is greater than that of ￿rm 1:
qrs
2 > qrs
1 ;r;s = h;l (i.e. ￿rm 2 is more aggressive than ￿rm 1). Moreover, it is




@￿ < 0; which means that the output level of ￿rm 1 decreases
with the percentage of the shares that shareholder A has in ￿rm 2. Therefore,
the greater the value of parameter ￿ the lower the output level of ￿rm 1.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, shareholders A and B simultaneously choose
the production technology of ￿rms 1 and 2, respectively. Let:
F￿1 =
c(4 ￿ ￿)(a(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c)
b(3 ￿ ￿)
2 ;F￿2 =










where F￿1, F￿2; F1 and F2;are the investments needed to adopt the cost-









respectively. It is straightforward to see that F1 > max{F￿1;F2} > F￿2; where
F￿1 > F2 if and only if a < a1 =
c(4+￿(4￿￿))
￿(5￿￿) : Solving this stage we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 1: Under partial ownership of rivals, if F ￿ F￿2 both ￿rms choose
Technology-l. If F > F1 both ￿rms choose Technology-h. And, if F￿2 < F ￿ F1
only one ￿rm chooses Technology-l: In this last case, if ￿ ￿ 0:3649 Technology-
h is adopted by ￿rm 1 and Technology-l is adopted by ￿rm 2; if ￿ < 0:3649
and F￿1 < F < F2 either ￿rm may adopt Technology-l while Technology-h is
adopted by ￿rm 1 and Technology-l is adopted by ￿rm 2 otherwise:
The result obtained in Proposition 1 for the case ￿<0.3649 is illustrated in









A (j = h;l) which re￿ ects the positive incentive that
both shareholders have to adopt Technology-l caused by both (I) and (II). But,
since in our model the adoption of Technology-l requires an investment, di⁄erent
investment levels will produce di⁄erent results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is
su¢ ciently low, F ￿ F￿2, (I) and (II) together dominate (III) and both ￿rms
￿nd the adoption of Technology-l pro￿table. By contrast, if F is su¢ ciently
high, F > F1; (III) dominates (I) and (II) together and both ￿rms adopt
Technology-h. For intermediate values of F, F￿2 < F ￿ F1; the adoption of the
cost-saving technology by a single ￿rm induces a higher net price and a larger
market share for the ￿rm that adopts this technology, at the expense of the other
￿rm￿ s net price and market share, which is large enough for (I) and (II) to o⁄set
(III) in the ￿rm that adopts Technology-l. As a result, only one ￿rm adopts
the cost-saving technology. On the other hand, we have seen that ￿rm 2 is more
aggressive in the product market than ￿rm 1, which means that in general ￿rm 1
5has less incentives to adopt the cost-saving technology than ￿rm 2. The reason
for this result is the following. If ￿rm 1 adopts Technology-l it will be more
aggressive than if it adopts Technology-h: Given that shareholder A owns ￿ per
cent of the shares of ￿rm 2, he internalizes the fact that the two ￿rms compete
in the product market and thus he prefers to choose the technology with the
greater marginal production cost for ￿rm 1. It must be noted that if ￿ < 0:3649;
either ￿rm may adopt Technology-l when F￿1 < F < F2: The reason is that
although shareholder A owns ￿ per cent of the shares of ￿rm 2, this percentage
is low enough. And, thus, there are two equilibria for intermediate values of
parameter F: one ￿rm adopts Technology-h and the other Technology-l.
Proposition 2: Under partial ownership of rivals: @F￿2
@￿ < 0; @F1
@￿ > 0; and
@(F1￿F￿2)
@￿ > 0.
Under partial ownership of rivals we obtain that the range of values of para-
meters F and a for which both ￿rms adopt either Technology-l or Technology-h
decreases with the percentage of the shares, ￿, that the owner of ￿rm 1 has in
￿rm 2 (@F￿2
@￿ < 0, @F1
@￿ > 0). As a result, the range of values of parameters F
and a for which only one ￿rm adopts Technology-l increases with parameter ￿
(
@(F1￿F￿2)
@￿ > 0). This means that, compared to the case in which each ￿rm
is owned by only one shareholder, under partial ownership there is a greater
range of values for which we obtain the asymmetric equilibria in which only
one ￿rms adopts Technology-l . However, under partial ownership the range of
values of parameters F and a for which both ￿rms adopt either Technology-l or
Technology-h is lower. The intuition explaining this result is the following. On
the one hand, as shareholder A internalizes the fact that ￿rms 1 and 2 compete
in the product market, ￿rm 1 is less aggressive than ￿rm 2. On the other hand,
a ￿rm is more aggressive in the product market when adopting Technology-l
than when adopting Technology-h. This implies that from the point of view of
shareholder A the incentive to adopt Technology-h is reinforced. By contrast,
shareholder B will attempt to take advantage of this situation, which reinforces
his incentive to adopt Technology-l: Finally, the greater the value of parameter
￿ is the greater these incentives are.
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Fig. 1. Technology chosen by owners for a<0.3349
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